Timid or Smart: Reconsidering General George B. McClellan

Sure the Union had supply problems, but so did Lee of course! Send in the men in rags if need be. He definitely could have attacked on the second day and he definitely could have pursued Lee. How can he not be ready when he had just fought 12 hours before?

Very well-done and interesting video, although I am unpersuaded. The state of the union army is only part of the question. How did it compared to the state of the Confederate Army? Lee and Co. had fought masterfully, but at a high cost. Lee had no fresh reserves, nor was he being supplied. In contrast, between the two corps he had not used on the day of the battle and reinforcement that arrived after the battle, McClellan had 32,000 fresh troops. That was as much or more than Lee had started with the day before. Second, one can't interpret the failure to pursue out of context. He had Lee's entire battleplan. Nevertheless, he had dithered, allowing Lee to consolidate his forces in part. But, McClellan had more than twice as many troops as Lee at Antietam. During the battle, McClellan's piecemeal and disjointed attacks meant the Union never brought its numerical advantage to bear. He fought the whole campaign too passively. That undermines the argument that he reacted properly on the 18th. Third, one must be careful to rely too heavily on a few anecdotes. They almost entirely came from the 1st corp., which had been heavily engaged. They say nothing about the 5th and 6th corps or the reinforcements that had just arrived. Finally, McCellan's loyalty to the union was suspect. He wanted Lincoln to fail. He wanted a soft victory (one that would return the country to the pre-war status quo). In retrospective, both his writing to his wife and his actions (in failing to help Pope at the 2nd Bull Run and after Antietam) strongly suggest too much caution at best and insubordination or more at worst.

I have respect for McClellan. He actually cared about his men and didn't want their lives thrown away. Big difference from Grants war of attrition. They were just numbers.

Any study of the Peninsula Campaign, will show McClellan being told by Lincoln and others in the administration constantly, that a corps had to remain between Washington and the enemy! This is why McDowell was taken from him at the very start of that campaign, and why he couldn't get him back!
McClellan does this at Antietam... ( holds a corps between DC and the enemy ) and is criticized for following that exigency! An exigency, again, hammered into McClellan by the administration prior to Antietam on the Peninsula...

The biggest blunder in US military history was the dividing of the Army of the Potomac by the Chickahominy River. This was forced on McClellan by the administration!
This order exposed McClellan's long supply route, and diverted troops to act north of Richmond in support of McDowell etc. !
McClellan wanted McDowell to come by the James, so that he could extend his line from the Chickahominy to that river! He was denied by the administration, of course!
Why?
BECAUSE A CORPS ALWAYS HAD TO STAY BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND THE ENEMY!

The division of the AoP at Richmond caused the Seven Days, and, at least, the 200, 000 US casualties that followed the next three years of the war in the east! It took two years and 160, 000 casualties to go the mile from Harrison's Landing to City Point to besiege Petersburg... All the fault of the administration!!

PS : Just read the Official Records, and you will see that the CSA thought McClellan's operation against Richmond irresistible because McClellan would " make it a battle of posts, " R E Lee. That is, his fortifying of his lines against theirs would make an offensive against him too costly. This is why none was attempted prior to Fair Oaks/Seven Pines, when the CSA was desperate because of Mac being 5 miles from taking Richmond... and why that failed! Only when McClellan's front was divided and his right left hanging in the air, did the CSA succeed against him. Again this was entirely the fault of Lincoln and the administration!
McClellan told the administration constantly that his concentration against Richmond would compel the CSA to bring all available forces there to defend that base of operations. Troops were brought from Manassas, Fredericksburg, NC, SC, Norfolk, the Valley, and maybe some from the west, too... to defend that base, as McClellan said!
Yet, his command was reduced by 40, 000, lol! By the administration!

Laziness is the basis of the attacks upon McClellan. Go wonder around Redoubt Park at Williamsburg - what's left of the CSA's Williamsburg Line, and tell me that these defenses could be stormed without great loss of life and material!
Mac wasn't there to lose thousands against Yorktown or Williamsburg... or in defense of an overextended supply route... he was there to take the CSA's Virginia base of active operations! He understood this... Lincoln et al did not!
Mac was a great commander in the field and strategist!
Lincoln wasn't... end of story!

People forget it was McClellan who stopped Lee from marching on Washington. It was a big deal and he never gets the credit.

I personally find the conspiracy theory regarding McClellan to be compelling. McClellan was a politically ambitious democrat, and was accurately seen as a 1864 contender. The understanding, based on the Mexican-American war making three different presidential nominees and two presidents, was that the most successful union general would be the next to win after Lincoln. I imagine Halleck and Stanton and perhaps others were worried that if McClellan was successful, he would be the next president, and him being a democrat, this was viewed with great concern. I wouldn't put this past Halleck at least at all. Thus, I think it is a legitimate possibility that Halleck undermined McClellan with these insufficient resupplies in order to cost McClellan either his campaign or his job, for the purpose of partisan politics. This sort of thing was a problem in the Mexican American war too.

There's no need to reconsider him, dude was a failure on the battle field. Lee's battle plans were discovered by Union troops before Antietam, a good general would've made it a death blow for their opponent (like how US figured out what Japanese wanted to do prior to Midway). Yet somehow, he allowed Lee to escape and continue fighting on the Eastern Front. After Midway, Japanese never threatened USA again, while the Confederates threatened the Union about twice more.

McClellan demonstrated a decided lack of initiative and an inability to capitalize on advantages throughout the war. His primary motivation, if you read the letters he sent to his wife, was obviously to advance his own political career, and thus refused to put himself in a position to be defeated. Contrast this with Grant, who understood that every costly Confederate victory brought the CSA inexorably closer to defeat. McClellan lacked the conviction that the Northern Cause was the right one, and it shows in his decisions. Asking whether he was timid or smart is asking the wrong question.

Haa!
(that's "Hi!", in Southern accent)

Many of the people in the comments are acting like an offensive in the East would have even achieved the stated aims. It wouldn't. There was too little room and too many forces in one place. McClellan realized this, and tried to get the focus of the war where it should have been, in the Mid-West and West. Cutting the Mississippi and using their superior numbers/industry to outflank the Confederates so they couldn't defend against everything was the best strategy to take advantage of the Union's strengths. It's what eventually won the war.

It was far more important to keep the Army of the Potomac intact and a latent threat/defense than it was to actually commit to a major, costly offensive that risked destroying the army and thus the political will to fight the war. The main reason he is criticized for "lack of aggression" is because of the political nature of the East, where attacking was seen as the politically correct thing to do, regardless of the capabilities or strategic necessity of doing so on that front.

Gotta love the number of people in the comments blindly defending the popular narrative without any actual knowledge of the Civil War beyond the most surface level of details.

I am related to him

I'm sorry...but the man was an arsehole and acting so far above his competence it is tragic he was so heavily relied upon.

Fair point, but weren't the Rebels equally undersupplied, outnumbered grossly, further from their supply lines, and in retreat several times? And didn't McClellan have Lee's battle plans, giving him a stellar opportunity to knock out the strongest opposing army? Also, doesn't keeping his men back so often exacerbate the supply problem, the swiftest solution to which would have been to pursue and destroy the opposing army?

War would had ended sooner if he had not been made general. My own personal theory was he hated Lincoln, was pro slavery(fact) and I believe he thought if he could make the war last longer he could run for president and win over war weary citizens to vote for him….in the end he was a terrible war general

McClellan was a coward and a traitor to the Union.

he was very cautious with his soildiers and very protective of his army.

Sun Tzu had something to say about this as one of his "Five Fatal Flaws" for a general. The fifth was, "over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble." McLellan violated this egregiously.

The entire union army was underequipped. While his contemporaries were doing more with less, McClellan did far less with more.

Men can march without boots. Lee’s men did 🤷🏼‍♂️. He’s a whiiiiimp.

When everybody’s naked, that’s when the men are separated from the boys hahah.

Makes total sense.

Timid or smart? How about the third option? Treasonous! By prolonging the war, Mac was already trying to make the population weary of war. No matter what his outward reasoning was, he was stalling! Grant didn’t seem to have that problem, and who was the democrat representative in the ‘64 election? Also Mac’s answer was to let the south go, instead of preserving the union! Hero! I think not! Actions speak louder than words!

Me and George share common ancestors in Scotland. He’s from strong stock being an ancestor of Sir Patrick Maclellan.

The biggest flaw of McClellan was he was too selfish. Way too selfish... People say he was incompetent but that couldnt be farther from the truth.. He was actually a brilliant commander and if there was anyone that could defeat General Lee it would be McClellan. The sad reality is the McClellan knew best on how to defeat the CSA but also he was not going to do it! He had his eyes on political maneuvering to make Lincoln look bad and gain the Presidency for him self. He used the Army for his on political personal needs and ambitions ahead of the US Army and his country. His greatest flaw! However the Northern Armies eventual victory over the South had a lot to do with McClellan and his superb organizing and training of his vast army. All a General needed to do is do what McClellan would not.. And that was to attack for the sole reason of complete victory! Something Grant did when Lincoln fired McClellan.

Was McClellan timid or smart? He was timid and a coward. Hands down and no explanation needed.

He was a coward . And insubordinate ( a bum ) , because a soldier is suppose to show respect for their superiors and in many recorded instances , he disrespected them. He had this false impression that he was indispensable and important but proved that he wasn't qualified.

I don’t care about what he did after the battle of Antietam, it matters more his failure both before and during Antietam. To not press the rebels after south mountain was a mistake, and is of course one of the major causes as to the casualty rate of the battle. The biggest mistake however was the decision to hold so much of his army in reserve. To outnumber the enemy 2:1 and fail to gain the flank or break through the line at any point is nothing short of a blunder. Being so close to achieving both over the course of the battle as it was, and failing to allocate more troops to press the advantage is ultimately why Antietam was not a decisive victory. The lives of his troops would have been better spared by attacking and advancing, instead of the overly cautious reservation of units. Leaving so many rifles in reserve made the fighting that much more difficult and deadly for those already in action. There is little doubt the war would have been greatly shortened by driving the confederates from sharpsburg having sustained more grievous casualties.

According to his son, when asked who was the greatest general of the Union, Robert E. Lee replied "McClellan, by all means!"

Another thing to remember is that Lincoln was a classic micromanager. He spent more time in the telegraph office than anywhere else and travelled to personally visit the commanders and give his orders constantly. While it's certainly not a crime for a president to be invested in the war that was undoubtedly his war, it meant that he was making the decisions that his generals often were criticized for.

McClellan was the absolute best choice for an invasion that intended to spend a lot of time in the target country. In the War with Mexico, he was well known for resting a very light hand on the civilian population. Civilians didn't cause problems in the districts where he had control, because they knew there was little risk to fear, and because there were few crimes to avenge. In a war with a population that was dedicated by an overwhelming majority to this war, the ability to calm civilians and prevent partisan attacks was pretty valuable.

But this wasn't what Lincoln wanted. He began the war with his "Anaconda Plan," blockading even food and medicine, to make the civilian population suffer, and like Buell, McClellan's constant calls to not abuse the women and children of the area didn't just fall on deaf ears, but increasingly angry ones.

This, I am certain, is why McClellan was replaced, and since he was understandably bitter about it, the party machine went to work to smear him.

There is evidence that perhaps tens of thousands of Union troops didn't have shoes, blankets, over-coats and tents. The Union Army had been pretty much marching and fighting for five months by that time. When the troops arrived from the Peninsula, they were sent straight to Pope's Army, before they could meet up with much of their equipment. And after participating in the Second Battle of Bull Run, they were immediately marched to Antietam. The Army supply situation was absolute chaos.

As for pursuing Lee after Antietam, it's easy to say do it on paper. But the Army was absolutely wrecked from five months of fighting and having participated in the bloodiest day in American history. As for not beginning a WINTER campaign a month later, who in their right mind would embark on a winter campaign when you've got tens of thousands of soldiers who don't have winter clothing or shoes?

As far as their being a conspiracy against McClellan, it was pretty much out in the open. McClellan's opponents in the government (the cabinet, the congress and even in the army) had made it clear that they would do anything to have McClellan removed. And they were clearly sabotaging him. It was a secret conspiracy, it was out in the open.

“My logisticians are a humorless lot … they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.”

There is a very large difference between winning battles and winning wars. McClellan was a very timid commander, he said so himself numerous times in the books he wrote after the war. He really cared for his soldiers, and they loved him in return. He simply didn't like his men getting killed, but that makes you a very poor choice for a job where it is your job to put tens of thousands of people in a position where they WILL die. Where he truly shined however, was as a staff officer, the guys in charge of winning campaigns and wars. When asked who the best Union commander of the war was, Robert E. Lee did not say George Meade who beat him at Gettysburg, or Sherman who cut the south in half, or even Grant who cornered him at Appomattox, but enthusiastically said George McClellan.

The two men that did more than any others to drag out the Civil War were McClellan and Lee. Imagine how different the war would have gone if neither of them were around. Better yet, imagine if McClellan had fought for the south and Lee for the north.

Hard to get supplies you've requisitioned when the war effort is overseen by the likes of corrupt snakes like Halleck, surrounded as he was by the most vile profiteers.

Secondly, it is abundantly clear that John Pope blackmailed Halleck not just into the despicable court martial of Porter, but probably also into firing McClellan as well.

At best, say the critics, McClellan was a good organizer, but a bad battle leader.

This utterly nonsensical cliche persists throughout amateur Civil War buff communities, as it conveniently shifts away blame from the Washington cabal that put the likes of Pope, Burnside, and Hooker in charge of the Eastern army. As for Gettysburg, it is really only pure good luck that Hooker angrily resigned to be replaced by what turned out to be a sort of bargain bin McClellan: Meade. Note also that Meade had generally effective corps commanders whereas McClellan's corps commanders were often picked for him by the Republican administration specifically to be Republican opponents of his within the Army. Thus McClellan had to act as a quasi-Wellington, who, at Waterloo, used his thoroughbreds to ride rapidly from one crisis point to the other. That was impossible to do in battles as large as Antietam, and so we get the spectacle of Burnside dicking around all morning when he clearly had an order to attack no later than 9 AM. Then Burnside used his political connections to foist an obviously deceitful report upon McClellan, who accepted it for no less political reasons.

Moreover, Lincoln and especially Halleck consistently gave McClellan contradictory orders during October, 1862. The man had been prepared to attempt an assault of the rebels in the vicinity of Winchester, but Lincoln, in a letter that is frankly snide and amateurish, ordered him not to advance west of the mountains and otherwise limited his options severely. Then these same men fired McClellan for slowness after they gave him orders effectuating slowness AND not properly supplying the Army!

Of course, as Pope's own letters in conjunction with the timing of things indicate, Halleck probably was also blackmailed by Pope (who had dirt on him from the Corinth debacle) to fire McClellan. I do not think Lincoln was aware of this dimension; he had his own grudges against McClellan because McClellan's sane and reasonable policy of conciliation towards civilians was a bit much for the Radical Republicans who had so much power.

It's actually amazing that McClellan did as well as he did considering the limitations placed upon him by a combination of inexperienced subordinates, green soldiers, political corruption, and wanton interference or shocking incompetence by the men around the Lincoln administration (including the generals they forced upon McClellan).

It’s been documented that McClellan once went to bed instead of talking to Lincoln; who he knew was waiting in his living room.
It’s not too much of a stretch to believe he would hold up supplies as an excuse for not pursuing Lee.

Do you think he may have had this supply problem if he was more decisive and pushed aggressively before cold weather set in?

It is not inconceivable that McClellan was so concerned about supply lines and proper uniforming because he had, after all, been an observer during the Crimean War, and thus seen the consequences of how the soldiers suffered due to a lack of supplies and clothing. Due to the neglect of the commanding officers the British and French soldiers were anything but prepared for the conditions that developed during the Crimean War, and Little Mac probably decided that would never happen to his troops.

didn't make me rethink. but you found some good excuses for him 🙂

TOO BAD HE WASN'T PRESIDENT. IM SURE HE CLAIMED THE ELECTIO WAS RIGGED TOO

If McClellan had the slows, Lincoln had the murderous rush.
The south was going to lose the war militarily and every single General knew it on both sides when the war kicked off. There was no reason to foolishly send your mean to their death for newspaper headlines.
But, politics wins when politicians run wars.

Gen. McClellan was given a raw real by the politicos in Washington D.C. who wanted him out of position in charge as CG of The Union's Army of The Potomac, possibly including Pres. Lincoln himself

Wonderful narration. Great job.

Ok but if the Army was undersupplied under McClellan to the point where it was impossible to pursue Lee, that begs the question: did Burnside have the same problem? Did everything suddenly arrive when McClellan was removed? If so, there should be evidence of this; otherwise, Burnside would suffer from the same delay until the problem was fixed.

There‘s also the question of just how reasonable these deficiencies as reasons for the whole army to remain idle for several months.

This is definitely an interesting angle to McClellan‘s firing, but it does raise further questions that need to be answered and is not an obvious out that immediately justifies McClellan‘s actions.

I do buy Halleck as potentially suspect, and someone who might intentionally undermine McClellan and others. Some of his actions as a District and Theatre Commander out West look really bad, and he actually had serious bouts of hesitation of his own. In fact, one could read his ordering McClellan back from the Peninsula in exactly this way: McClellan made tactical retreats against Lee, but then beat him pretty well at the end of the Seven Days. He then wants to move on Richmond again, but Halleck orders him back for „reasons“. Even though he‘s right in front of Richmond? That makes no sense.

But McClellan does have plenty of questionable qualities.

Leaving Antietam aside for the moment, there are two things that McClellan does that are, to me, completely unacceptable in a field commander.

1. McClellan leaves the field. In several of his battles, McClellan isn‘t with his Army, commanding it, but observing from a distance, and someone else is actually in Field command. For example, Porter during Malvern Hill. McClellan still gets results, and Malvern Hill is still arguably to his credit, but for an Army Commander in the 1860s it is completely unacceptable. Rosecrans lost his command for abandoning the Field at Chickamauga, so this was clearly a demand that was—rightfully—made of Union Generals. The Army commander needs to be with his Army, on the field of Battle.
2. The other, possibly worse thing that McClellan does is his sort of passive-aggressive insubordination, where Lincoln tells him to do X and he just…doesn‘t. Yeah he comes up with a reason but that‘s not how the military works. Arguably the worst example of this is Second Bull Run, where McClellan refuses to link up with and support Pope. And he plain refuses, saying it‘s too dangerous. This is borderline treasonous. Let me be clear: it didn‘t change the outcome of the battle. Pope is 100% responsible for the Catastrophe and nothing McClellan did could have changed it, there was no helping him except maybe help cover the retreat. BUT: McClellan can‘t know that. If Pope was more competent, a single Corps from McClellan‘s army could easily have been decisive. Imagine how history could have turned out if Buell refused to reinforce Grant at Pittsburgh Landing, because of how dangerous it was. It was even more dangerous, because he was sending them across the Tennessee River and if Grant went down, all their Union forces would have got wiped out. But he still did it. In war, if the Commander in Chief orders you to support your fellow officer, you do it, to the best of your ability, period. But McClellan couldn‘t be arsed to move a single Corps forward to at least link up with Pope‘s army. Again, we are leaving the realm of „unacceptable“ and approaching the borderline of „treasonous“.

Excuse me, but were the Confederates amply supplied with food, clothing, bedding, tents, etc.? Were the Confederates ever hungry or cold when they fought? Just curious.

Your claim that there were Union soldiers who were without shoes and other supplies does not justify your claim that they were just as ill supplied as the enemy. The question is whether their lack of supplies were of a sort that would have prevented them from fighting. The rest of Civil War history showed that soldiers can move and fight in even worse conditions.

Also, Lee did not leave immediately after the battle. If something made the army incapable of fighting it had to have been a change that occurred between the day of the battle and the day after. On the day of the battle, the soldiers were fit for battle. Did they lose all of these shoes and blankets in 1 day of fighting? Unlikely, since they held the field. So, this could not explain the difference between being capable of fighting and unable to fight.

Read Team of Rivals by Doris Kearns Goodwin. McClellan had issues with Lincoln, Seward & Cameron/Stanton. He made excuse after excuse not to engage with the enemy. He was egotistical & acted as though he was in charge rather than the president or secretaries. He was political using his position to influence congressman/senators against the administration. eventually Lincoln had enough & fired him.

McCellan is the classic stuffed shirt. The perfect soldier on paper, which is where he should have stayed, pushing papers

Did a great job building an army didn't live up to the expectations, he should have had a desk job in the war department he was much more suited for that role

THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS CALLED ANTIETAM A UNION VICTORY.LEE WROTE AFTER THE CIVIL WAR THAT IF MCCLELAN HAD THROWN IN HIS EXTRA 20,000 RESERVES INTO THE BATTLE AT THE BATTLES END LEE'S ARMY WOULD HAVE BEEN DESTROYED.💖🌹🩵✝️✡️MAY THE MIRACLE OF JESUS OF CZESTOCHOWA AND OUR LADY OF CLEARWATER BLESS EVERYBODY HERE AMEN 24 RAYS OF GOD AROUND THE SUN AMEN 🔅🔅🔅🌀🌀🌀